What is the role of China’s “magic weapon” of influence?

According to its founder Mao Zedong and current President Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China possesses a “magic weapon”.

It’s called the United Front Work Department, and it’s causing as much panic in the West as Beijing’s growing military arsenal.

Yang Tengbo, famous businessman linked to prince andrewHe is the latest overseas Chinese citizen to face scrutiny and sanctions over his ties to the United Front Work Department.

The department’s existence is far from secret. As a decades-old and well-documented branch of the Chinese Communist Party, it has been mired in controversy before. Investigators from the United States to Australia have named the United Front Work Department in numerous espionage cases, often accusing Beijing of using it for foreign interference.

Beijing denies all espionage accusations, calling them ridiculous.

So what is UFWD and what does it do?

The United Front – originally referring to a broad communist alliance – was hailed by Mao Zedong as the key to the Communist Party’s victory in China’s decades-long civil war.

After the war ended in 1949 and the Communists began to rule China, United Front activities gave way to other priorities. But the past decade under Xi Jinping has seen something of a resurgence in the United Front.

Marek Olberg, a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, said Xi Jinping’s version of the united front is broadly consistent with earlier versions: “Building the broadest possible alliance with all relevant social forces.”

On the surface, the United Front Work Department is not mysterious—it even has a website on which many of its activities are reported. But the scope of its work and its reach are unclear.

Dr. Allberg said that while a large part of this work was carried out at home, “a key target of the United Front work is the Chinese overseas”.

Today, the United Front seeks to influence public discussion on sensitive issues including Taiwan, a territory claimed by China, and repression of ethnic minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang.

It has also sought to shape the narrative about China in foreign media, target overseas critics of the Chinese government, and co-opt influential overseas Chinese figures.

“United front work can include espionage, but [it] It’s broader than espionage,” Audrye Wong, assistant professor of political science at the University of Southern California, told the BBC.

“In addition to the act of obtaining secret information from foreign governments, United Front activities focus on the broader mobilization of overseas Chinese,” she said, adding that China’s “scale and scope of such influence activities is unique.”

China has always had ambitions for such influence, but its rise in recent decades has given Beijing the ability to exercise it.

Since Xi Jinping took office as president in 2012, he has been particularly proactive in formulating China’s message to the worldEncourage confrontation “Wolf Warrior” diplomatic policy, and urged overseas Chinese to “tell China’s story well.”

The United Front Work Department operates through various overseas Chinese community organizations that vigorously defend the Communist Party abroad. They censored anti-CCP artwork and protested the activities of Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama. The United Front Work Department has also been linked to threats against members of persecuted ethnic minorities abroad such as Tibetans and Uyghurs.

But much of the United Front’s work overlaps with other party agencies and operates in a manner that observers describe as “specious deniability.”

It is this ambiguity that arouses suspicion and concern about the United Front.

When Yang appealed against his ban, the judges agreed with the then-Secretary of State’s report that Yang “posed a threat to national security” on the grounds that he had downplayed his ties to the United Front, which led them to conclude that One of the reasons for the conclusion.

However, Yang insists he did nothing illegal and that the espionage accusations are “completely untrue.”

Cases like Mr. Yang’s are increasingly common. In 2022, British Chinese lawyer Christine Lee was accused by MI5 of cultivating relationships with influential people in the UK through UFWD. The following year, Liang Litang, an American citizen who ran a Chinese restaurant in Boston, was indicted for providing information about Chinese dissidents in the area to contacts in the United Front Work Department.

In September, Linda Sun, a former aide in the New York governor’s office, was accused of using her position to serve the interests of the Chinese government — receiving benefits including travel in return. According to Chinese state media, she met with a senior official from the United Front Work Department in 2017, who told her to “be an ambassador of Sino-US friendship.”

It is not uncommon for prominent and successful people in China to be associated with the Communist Party, and they often need the party’s approval, especially in the business world.

But where is the line between influence peddling and espionage?

Hong Haofeng, a professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, said that when it comes to Beijing’s actions, “the line between influence and espionage is blurred.”

This ambiguity was further compounded in 2017 when China passed a law requiring Chinese citizens and companies to cooperate with intelligence investigations, including sharing information with the Chinese government, a move that Dr Hong said “effectively turned everyone into a potential spy” intensified.

The Ministry of National Security released a dramatic propaganda video warning the public that foreign spies are everywhere and “they are cunning and sneaky.”

Some students sent on specialized trips abroad have been told by their universities to limit contact with foreigners and asked to provide reports on their activities upon return.

Yet Xi Jinping is keen to promote China to the world. He therefore tasked trusted elements within the party with projecting power abroad.

This is becoming a challenge for Western powers – how do they balance doing business with the world’s second-largest economy and serious security concerns?

Genuine concerns about China’s influence abroad are fueling hawkish sentiment in the West, often posing a dilemma for governments.

Some countries, such as Australia, are trying to protect themselves through new foreign interference laws Criminalize individuals deemed to interfere in internal affairs. In 2020, the United States imposed visa restrictions on those deemed actively involved in UFWD activities.

An angry Beijing has warned that such laws and the prosecutions they trigger would hamper bilateral ties.

“The so-called Chinese espionage accusation is completely ridiculous,” a foreign ministry spokesman told reporters on Tuesday in response to a question about Yang Jiechi. The development of China-UK relations is in the common interests of both countries.

Some experts said that the long arm of China’s united front is indeed worrying.

“Western governments now need to stop being naïve about China’s united front work and view it as a serious threat not only to national security but also to the safety and freedom of many Chinese citizens,” Dr Hong said.

But, he added, “the government also needs to be vigilant against anti-Chinese racism Work hard to build trust and cooperation with the Chinese community to jointly respond to threats.

In December last year, Vietnamese-born Australian Chinese community leader Di Sanh Duong was convicted of planning foreign interference for trying to curry favor with Australian ministers. Prosecutors argued that he was an “ideal target” for the United Front because he ran for office in the 1990s and bragged about his ties to Chinese officials.

Duong’s trial centered around what he meant when he said the minister’s participation in charity events would benefit “we Chinese” – was he referring to the Chinese community in Australia, or the Chinese community in mainland China?

Ultimately, Duong’s conviction and imprisonment raised serious concerns that such broad espionage laws and prosecutions could easily become Weapons against the Chinese.

“It is important to remember that not everyone of Chinese descent is a supporter of the Chinese Communist Party. And not everyone involved in these diaspora organizations has a strong loyalty to China,” Dr. Huang said.

“Overly aggressive policies based on racial profiling will only legitimize the Chinese government’s propaganda that the Chinese are unwelcome, ultimately pushing diaspora communities further into Beijing’s arms.”